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Abstract
The deep seabed has one of the most enriched biodiverse places on Earth. Scientists have found 
some essential biomedical breakthroughs derived from hydrothermal vents involved in treating 
disease outbreaks among seabed minerals. Futuristic as it may sound, new pharmaceutical 
discoveries pressure the International Seabed Authority (ISA) into strengthening its global 
rules on mining exploitation beyond areas of national jurisdiction (ABNJ).  This paper presents 
a general evaluation of the existing legal system of deep seabed mining. It highlights that, 
increasingly, pharmaceutical companies are shifting to ABNJ seabed areas for exploitation, 
pressuring the international order for a more coherent and effective mining exploitation system 
for the next decade. The analysis of international legal frameworks for the Law of the Sea is 
notable. However, there are still substantial gaps in deep seabed mining’s global governance, 
expected to commence soon, as ISA rushes to approve a new international mining code. The 
result supports a transparent mining exploitation process in ABNJ, facilitating cooperation 
between sectors and between countries, fostering equitable sharing, and preserving the fragile 
ecosystem. 
Keywords : Law of the sea, UNCLOS, health emergency, Deep seabed, International Seabed 
Authority 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The deep ocean is one of the most biodiverse environments on Earth. 
Amongst seabed minerals,1 scientists have found some of the essential 
biomedical breakthroughs derived from hydrothermal vents, directly linked to 
the treatment of disease outbreaks. Therefore, the beneficial outlines of seabed 
microbiology species are not an unknown territory for science, as many of its 
components have already given us recent cancer treatments.2 
1  According to article 133 (b) UNCLOS 1982, “Resources, when recovered from the Area, are 
referred to as ‘minerals’.” See SDC of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (IT-
LOS), Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities concerning 
Activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion) (Seabed Disputes Chamber Case No 17, 1 February 
2011) [SDC Advisory Opinion 2011], para 200.
2  See the usage of seabed minerals towards the pharmaceutical industry: Claire W. Armstrong, 
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The deep seabed comprises the ocean space beyond the continental shelf, 
and the Area, defined by UNCLOS as any seabed surface below 200m. It 
covers around 360 million km2 of the Earth’s surface (∼50%) and represents 
95% of the global biosphere in terms of inhabitable volume.3 Attempts to hold 
a prominent political position on deep-seabed mining have created a legal 
rush for rights and concessions to extract its minerals. Seabed minerals are 
part of the concept of humankind’s common heritage, calling for the right 
balance between exploitation and economic development, equitable sharing 
of benefits, and urgent global research on new pharmaceutical developments.4 
To halt an epidemic situation, States may resort to their natural resources to 
tackle basic exploratory research, derived from UNCLOS on the jurisdictional 
framework for managing the continental shelf. However, unleashing the 
enormous potential of ABNJ minerals is the new order for the next five years, 
as regulatory standards are being shaped once again after 1982 with the 
International Seabed Authority (ISA) to clarify the roles and responsibilities 
of the various regulators in the Area. The procedure to become a commercial 
drug is complex. It involves much technical assistance from searching for 
novel structures to produce compounds that are active against diseases to 
laborious and commercial processes.5 Newman and Cragg observe that, on 
average, only 10% of preclinical candidates reach Phase I clinical trials, and 
only one or two will become commercial drugs.6 
The regulatory regime becomes even more problematic when it is stressed 
that some of the world’s most prominent leaders on biotechnology and drug 
testing are not State-parties to UNCLOS. Therefore, they are not subjected 
to Part XI of the Convention. Conversely, the UN Convention introduced 
the notion of humankind’s common heritage to safeguard resources from 
overexploitation under any circumstances thereof. However, one must observe 
that, during extraordinary circumstances as a global pandemic, and the urgent 
search for a new drug capable of halting the massive infection rates caused by 
a virus, questions about a legal framework for mining over states’ sovereign 
Naomi S. Foley, Robert Tinch, et al., “Services from the Deep: Steps Towards the Valuation of 
Deep-Sea Goods and Services,” Ecosystem Services 2, (2012): 2–13.
3  D. Thistle, “The Deep-sea Floor: An Overview,” in Ecosystems of the World Volume 28 First 
Edition, ed. P. A. Tyler (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2003), 5–39.
4  See also, Jennifer Tran Le, Lisa A. Levin, and Richard T. Carson, “Incorporating Ecosystem 
Services into Environmental Management of Deep-Seabed Mining,” Deep-Sea Research Part 2 
Topical Studies Oceanography 137, (2017): 486– 503. DOI: 10.1016/j.dsr2.2016.08.007 
5  David J. Newman and Gordon M, Cragg, “Political, Legal, Scientific and Financial Aspects 
of Marine Biodiscovery Programs,” in Conference on the Management of Deep-sea Fisheries 
FAO, 2003, 448.
6  Ibid.
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jurisdiction are keen to society as a whole.
The sea’s international law distinguishes exploration or exploitation, 
and marine scientific research (MSR), as the UNCLOS promotes different 
legal regimes to these occasions. The implications are multiple: One cannot 
pursue economic ends once it has been pursuing an MSR in the Area, as it 
highlights that scientific research under the auspices of the Convention can 
only be conducted with peaceful purposes. During an unprecedented health 
emergency, the laws governing the deep-sea ocean floor are pushed for a 
clear conception of what might constitute lawful mineral exploitation for 
medical purposes, even though no clear boundaries have been established on 
commercial intent.7 
 The Convention defines that “Activities in the Area shall be carried out for 
the benefit of mankind as specifically provided for in this part.”8 The Area shall 
be open to using only for peaceful purposes by all States.9 The International 
Seabed Authority (ISA) has played a dual mandate on environmental friendly 
seabed mineral extraction, recently announcing a Mining Code development. 
Today, there are 30 current exploration contracts concerning deep sea activities 
waiting for the approval to explore.10 Moreover, its vast, unexplored Area with 
rich biodiversity will be a critical geopolitical issue for the next decade as 
the mining code reaches a final version for publication. The ISA is gradually 
shaping a new international legal order for deep seabed mining, and as the 
corporations seek a profit-gained mechanism to legitimize their investments 
in the Area. 
This essay intends to assess whether the exploitation of minerals for the 
medical purpose would follow the criteria of activities in the Area.11 Given 
the nature, scale, and location of proposed seabed mining activities, adverse 
7  See the discussion about Covid-19 vaccine developments and whether the access will be 
public and free of costs to the population in some countries. To what extent the Laws governing 
the regime of exploration and exploitation in the Area are prepared to deal with pandemic situ-
ations and the search of medical novel instruments in the deep-seabed in ABNJ. “The push for 
a COVID-19 vaccine”, Accessed 04 October 2020, https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/
novel-coronavirus-2019/covid-19-vaccines?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIqvzL0sKa7AIVTNOyCh3f
NAiOEAAYASAAEgKyEfD_BwE. 
8  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay) 10 December 1982, in force 
16 November 1994, 21 ILM 1261 (UNCLOS), Art. 140.
9  Ibid. Shall the International Seabed Authority “provide for the equitable sharing of financial 
and other economic benefits derived from activities in the Area through any appropriate mecha-
nism, on a non-discriminatory basis, under article 160, paragraph 2(f)(i).” 
10  “An Assessment of the Risks and Impacts of Seabed Mining on Marine Ecosystems,” Fauna 
& Flora International, accessed 21 May 2020, www. fauna-flora.org.
11  See Note marked with (1) above, 94.
Laisa Branco de Almeida
4
effects on biodiversity seem inevitable.12 On the other hand, Commercial 
mining in national waters could start in 202013, In international waters no 
earlier than 2025. Perhaps halting a healthy global emergency requires all 
research material without further ado, economic benefits arising from such 
seabed exploitation in ABNJ alert to infringements of international law of 
the sea rules on protecting marine biodiversity Article 22 of Annex III of the 
UNCLOS. 
II. EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGULATION AND 
GUIDANCE
Exploring the seabed has been an ongoing practice for several decades. 
Some estimates show a global level rise of 10% by 2030 of exploratory 
activities on ocean floors.14 Excessive commercial exploitation of the world’s 
mineral resources may resort to irreversible damages to the deep seabed 
ecosystem. Oceans have a tremendous potential to contribute to the provision 
of food.15 Feed and the new commodities of the technology era, as minerals 
essential to the sector, e.g., cobalt, are present on a large scale on the ocean 
floor.16 
The total economic value (TEV) assessed for the deep-sea ecosystem 
as a whole has been estimated at 266/billion year USD in 2019, which is 
constituted by 92% by the economic value of abiotic resources  (oil and 
minerals).17 The economic interest in the deep-sea ocean floor in ABNJ is 
estimated at 30 billion/year USD for the next years, as mining activities in the 
deep-sea are still under the exploratory phase.  
Four major areas are economically hotspots for commercial exploitation 
on the ocean floor: (1) manganese (polymetallic) nodules, (2) seafloor 
12  See, for example, Pawan Patil, John Virdin, Michelle Diaz, et al., Toward A Blue Economy: 
A Promise for Sustainable Growth in the Caribbean, An Overview (Washington DC: The World 
Bank, 2016), 21.
13  “Deep-sea Mining,” International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), accessed 2 
October 2020, https://www.iucn.org/resources/issues-briefs/deep-sea-mining. 
14  European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic, and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 
Blue Growth - opportunities from marine and sustainable maritime growth. COM (2012): 10. 
15  See on fisheries, Rashid Hassan, Robert J. Scholes, Neville Ash, “Ecosystems and Human 
Well-Being: Current State and Trends,” (Millennium & Group, Trends, 2005), 477–511; “The 
State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture,” Food and Agriculture Organization of the Unit-
ed Nations, 2018.
16  The ISA has entered five contracts for cobalt-rich crusts in the Western Pacific Ocean.
17  “Report of the Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction Deep Sea Meeting 2019, 7–9 May 2019, 
Rome, Italy,” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2019, 23.  
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massive (polymetallic) sulfides, (3) cobalt-rich (polymetallic) crusts, and (4) 
phosphorites.18 The associated ecosystem’s distinctive environmental and 
ecological features reinforce the request to evaluate the significance of harm 
in the deep sea. In the 80s, side effects of harvesting the deep seabed prompted 
environmentalists to call for legislation protecting the environment. They 
feared seabed mining would begin without a law of the sea treaty to protect 
environmental concerns.19  The discussion on “Who shall be entitled to mine 
the nodules and thereby appropriate the richest of the ocean floor?; and (2) 
under what conditions should mining operations be carried out?” was present 
in the early stages of the manganese nodules discovery, although, in 1980, the 
economic viability of seabed mining remained unclear.20  
The United States, for example, enacted the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral 
Resources Act of 1980 (Seabed Resources Act), envisioning damages to the 
ocean floor, such as the suspension of lifted sediments in the water column. It 
may cause “the transplantation of spores or other dormant forms of organisms 
from one area to another, where favorable temperature, light, and oxygen 
conditions in the overlying water may reactivate them.” 21 
All mineral exploration and exploitation activities in the Area must be 
sponsored by a State Party to UNCLOS and approved by the International 
Seabed Authority (ISA), the UN-appointed body for dealing with activities in 
the Area. The Authority renders the following definition regarding the Nodules 
Regulations and Sulphides:
“Exploitation means the recovery for commercial purposes of polymetal-
lic nodules in the Area and the extraction of minerals from that place, in-
cluding the construction and operation of mining, processing, and trans-
portation systems for the production and marketing of metals.”22
18  See on each of the ecosystems mentioned above: Porter Hoagland, Stace Beaulieu, Maurice 
A. Tivey, et al., “Deep-Sea Mining of Massive Seafloor Sulfides,” Marine Policy 34, (2010): 
728–732; G.P. Glasby, “Lessons Learned From Deep-Sea Mining,” Science 289, no. 5479 (July, 
2000): 551–553; S.V. Margolis, R.G. Burns, “Pacific Deep-Sea Manganese Nodules: Their Dis-
tribution, Composition, and Origin,” Annual Review Earth Planet Science 4, no. 1 (1976): 
229–263.
19  See J. K. McCall, “A New Combination to Davy Jones’ Locker Melee Over Marine Miner-
als,” Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 9, no. 935 (1978): 962.
20  Ibid.
21  On the US legislation, see Public Law No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553 (1980) (codified at 26 USC. 
§§ 4495-4498 (1982 and 30 USC. §§ 1401-1473 (1982)); Scott C. Whitney, “Environmental 
Regulation of United States Deep Seabed Mining,” William & Mary Law Review 19, no. 1 
(1977): 80.
22  “International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea Finally Renders Advisory Opinion Establish-
ing that the Precautionary Principle is Incorporated Within UNCLOS Law,” ITSSD Journal, 
accessed 21 May 2020, https://itssdjournalunclos-lost.blogspot.com/2011/03/international-
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ISA shall, under the regime for the Area established in Part XI and this 
Agreement, organize and control activities in the Area, mainly to administer 
the Area’s resources.23 Contractors willing to submit a proposal for the Council 
are subjected to the approval of a work plan for exploration, following the 
receipt of a recommendation on the application from the Legal and Technical 
Commission.24 Similarly,  every project of work shall be accompanied by 
assessing the potential environmental impacts (EIAs) of the proposed activities 
and a description of a program for oceanographic and baseline environmental 
studies. The Commission expressed concern regarding the marine environment 
protection on the new mining code drafting proposal, mainly how to operate 
such principles and approaches as the review of contractors’ compliance with 
environmental obligations.25 A member of the Council session suggested a 
legal-binding regional environmental management Plan (REMPs). However, 
many uncertainties lie in the legal definition of work plans, as scholars see it 
as an obligation of general international law.26 
The Draft regulation 47 stresses the Commission’s priority to adopt a rule 
or a legally binding commitment of States on minimum EIA aspects. As an 
example,  the provision of public consultations on draft EIAs as part of the 
approval process and the open availability of EIAs once approved; a requirement 
to consult with relevant coastal States; a possibility for the Commission to 
require that certain conditions relating to mitigation of environmental impacts 
are included in EMMPs.27 Therefore, it is understandable that developing 
REMPs on the seabed as a scientific challenge to contractors, as minerals 
tribunal-on-law-of-sea.html
23   See Note marked with (5) above, UNCLOS, Annex IV, article 1, paragraph 1, of the Con-
vention mentions the attribution of responsibility to the Enterprise, “ the organ of the Authority 
which shall carry out activities in the Area directly, according to article 153, paragraph 2(a), 
and the transporting, processing and marketing of minerals recovered from the Area.”
24  UNCLOS, Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Annex, Section 01, 6. (a). 
25  “Comments on the draft regulations on the exploitation of mineral resources in the Area,” 
International Seabed Authority (ISA), 6 December 2019, accessed 21 May 2020, https://ran-
s3.s3.amazonaws.com/isa.org.jm/s3fs-public/files/documents/advance_isba_26_c_comments.
pdf.
26  As clarified in document ISBA/25/C/4, the REMPs are not themselves legal instruments but 
rather instruments of environmental policy. See Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in 
the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the 
San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica) (Joined Cases 16 December 2015) [2015] ICJ Report 
(‘Costa Rica v Nicaragua/Nicaragua v Costa Rica’) para 104.
27  See ISA, 17, 13. The first REMP for the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ) was adopted by 
the Council in 2012 (ISBA/18/C/22), based on the recommendation of the Legal and Technical 
Commission (LTC) (ISBA/17/LTC/7). Accessed 21 May 2020, https://www.isa.org.jm/miner-
als/environmental-management-plan-clarion-clipperton-zone>. 
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are still very poorly sampled, whereas biodiversity is high and variable.28 
Irrespective of the Council’s decision to uphold REMPs, the mining code 
itself shall have a clear legal definition to UNCLOS state parties. Questions 
remain on whether the policy instrument acts as a recommendation towards 
contractors or a full-operation International Treaty.  
The existing international governance bodies vary in their mandates and 
capacities to orchestrate mineral extraction in the deep seabed. UNCLOS 
directs the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction to be developed for the 
benefit of humankind.29 It is authorized to act on behalf of humanity - in the 
Area’s respect - solely the International Seabed Authority (ISA), safeguarding 
the principles enshrined under UNCLOS to include the substantial and uniform 
application of protecting the marine environment. At that time, exaggerated 
estimates on the value of deep-sea minerals projected a massive redistribution 
of wealth, while their exploitation’s environmental implications were hardly 
considered. Given this adjustment, deep-sea development for humankind’s 
benefit should be regarded as less of an obligation than an opportunity, the 
economic and social costs of which need to be carefully weighed against the 
economic and social benefits.
For seabed activities outside areas of national jurisdiction, the ISA shall 
ensure the adequate protection of the marine environment, particularly 
the need for protection from harmful effects of such activities as drilling, 
dredging, excavation, and the conservation of the natural resources of the 
Area.30 It is therefore understandable that the ISA both grants exploration 
permits and regulates mining activities. The Managing Impacts of Deep-
sea resource exploitation (MIDAS Project)31, funded by the European 
Commission, stresses the need of a regional environmental assessment, apart 
from the strategic environmental assessments (SEA), EIA approach, and the 
28  See Note (17), ISA, the Council relating to an environmental management plan for the 
Clarion-Clipperton Zone, ISBA/18/C/22, accessed 21 May 2020, https://www.isa.org.jm/
documents/isba18c22>. The ISBA official guidelines for Regional Environmental Manage-
ment Plans (REMPs) are accessed 21 May 2020 https://www.isa.org.jm/files/files/documents/
remp_guidance_.pdf>. 
29  See also A. Jaeckel, J. A. Ardron, K.M. Gjerde, “Sharing Benefits of The Common Heri-
tage of Humankind – Is The Deep Seabed Mining Regime Ready?” Marine Policy 70, (2016): 
198–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.03.00. See also, Kim poses the question: “Is 
commercial exploitation of non-renewable resources from the ocean floor today really in the 
interest of humanity?” Rakhyun E. Kim, “Should deep seabed mining be allowed?” Marine 
Policy 82, (2017): 134–137. DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2017.05.010
30  See Note marked with (5) above, Art. 145. 
31  “Implications Of MIDAS Results For Policymakers: Recommendations For Future Regula-
tions,” Managing Impacts of Deep-sea Resource Exploitation, 2016, accessed 21 may 2020, 
http://www.eumidas.net/sites/default/files/downloads/MIDAS_ recommendations_for_policy_
lowres.pdf
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Environmental Monitoring and Management Plans (EMMP).32 The existent 
natural risk of the operation may not impact itself, but a failure to ensure 
baseline assessment methods and monitoring requirements. The document 
goes further and lists 12 gaps in existing knowledge, including transparency 
standards, terms for defining functional ecological status, and the design and 
protection of protected areas.33 
Interestingly, Europe’s regional assessments assume a format of 
“environmental management plan for the CCZ.” The regional-scale risks may 
act as general guidelines for ISA on small scale operations and strengthen the 
scientific understanding of species’ distribution and the extent of gene flow 
among populations.
Inconsistencies are also found in Marine Scientific Research (MSR) in 
the Area, as UNCLOS art. 143 (3) diverges from Art. 256 on whether non-
state parties are eligible to engage in prospecting and exploration for mineral 
resources in the Area. Defining MSR differently from exploration, exploitation, 
and survey activities consistent with UNCLOS provisions as envisaged by 
newer legislation on the sea law since the former Convention did not define 
those terms.34 The new Mining Code explores legislations attained to seabed 
mineral exploitation, not to UNCLOS provisions on MSR in the Area. As 
MSR may include physical oceanography, scientific ocean drilling, marine 
biology, and other activities with a scientific purpose, it is worth mentioning 
its characteristics. States willing to engage in exploitation, meaning earning 
economic profits from their Area activities, shall not participate in UNCLOS 
provisions on MSR. Further clarifications on their actions must be clear to 
ISA’s Council and Scientific committees. 
 Part XIII of the Convention regulates MSR alone. Although no clear 
definition of its content is performed in the Area, it is expected to increase 
scientific knowledge of the marine environment for all humankind’s benefit.35 
The Authority may carry out marine scientific research relating to the Area 
and its mineral resources and entry contracts.36 The revised guide on MSR, 
published in 2010 by the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea 
(DOALOS), highlights that “The institutional framework for MSR in the Area, 
including the role and power of the Authority, was the subject of considerable 
32  Ibid., 25. 
33  Ibid., 25-26.
34  J. Ashley Roach, “Marine Scientific Research in the Area,” in Peaceful Order in the World’s 
Oceans: Essays in Honor of Satya N. Nandan, eds. Myron Nordquist, Michael Lodge (Amster-
dam: Brill, 2014): 272.
35  See Note marked with (5) above,  Art. 246 (3).
36  See Note marked with (5) above,  Art. 143, para. 2.
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discussions (...) during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea”.37 
 Intersections between MSR in the Area expect to hold attention to further 
requirements of Art. 143(3) to promote international cooperation in marine 
scientific research. States must be planned for “ Ensuring that they develop 
programs (...) for the benefit of developing States and technologically less 
developed States to strengthen their research capabilities, train their personnel.” 
As extensively exposed in the comments on the draft regulations on exploiting 
mineral resources in the Area, elaborating a complicated economic model and 
the contract’s financial terms do not create a sharing benefit system as MSR 
regulations on purpose. Therefore, the apparent inconsistencies regarding 
the definition of exploitation and MSR are sought from specific regulatory 
provisions. 
 The Draft regulations on exploitation of mineral resources in the Area38 
Offer a robust skeleton of environmental assessment guidelines for contractors 
in as much to the civil society. Perhaps ISA’s dual mandate to develop and 
protect the deep-sea forces the Authority39 To act fiercely on a mining code 
that contemplates environmental considerations and avoid any allegations 
of interest conflicts by the Institution. As mining the deep seabed minerals 
for commercial purposes is still years away, the transition from exploration 
to exploitation remains uncertain. In the meantime, legal rules are drafted, 
settling the next steps towards a common ground for states to exploit the Area 
in conformity with international law.
In retrospect, clarifications on contractors’ legal definition include state 
parties, state parties acting together through an international organization, state 
enterprises, and natural or juridical persons.40 Besides, the so-called extended 
continental shelf, under the auspices of State’s sovereign rights to exploit its 
natural resources, remains a challenge to define the boundary between seabed 
under national jurisdiction and that part of it considered Common Heritage 
of Mankind.41 Draft regulation 44 stresses the need to clarify several critical 
37  The various iterations of the draft art. One hundred forty-three are contained in Official Re-
cords of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol. IV (United Nations 
publication, Sales No. E.75.V.10) Part I, Art. 10; vol. V (United Nations publication, Sales No. 
E.76.V.8) Part I, Art. 10; vol. VIII (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.V.4) art. 143.
38  See Note marked with (19) above.
39  See J. R. Hein, “Prospects for Rare Earth Elements from Marine Minerals,” International 
Seabed Authority, Briefing Paper, May 2012: 2–5.
40  Ibid.
41 Michael W. Lodge, Kathleen Segerson, and Dale Squires. “Sharing and Preserving the Re-
sources in the Deep Sea: Challenges for the International Seabed Authority,” The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 32, (2017): 427-457.
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elements under the legal mining regime, such as “harmful effects,” “damage 
to the marine environment,” “Best Available Scientific Evidence.” 
In the next chapter, as the legal framework of the new Draft Regulations 
moves towards an approval, the subtopic on the responsibility of contractors 
remains vividly in the drafter’s brainbox, as consensus cannot be reached on 
the economic exploitation of seabed minerals in the Area. 
III. RESPONSIBILITIES AND OBLIGATIONS REGARDING 
THE OCEAN FLOOR
 The deep seabed mining involves two key actors: the contractor (who can 
be a state acting through an international organization, a state enterprise, or 
a private company), and the sponsoring country. According to UNCLOS, the 
ISA is the organ that decides upon the attribution of primary responsibility for 
deep seabed activities.42 The current liability regime does not directly attribute 
responsibility to a third actor, e.g., owner/operator of the vessel/installation or 
other equipment. Questions remain on whether it may be necessary to impose 
a certain level of liability under the Draft Resolutions of the mining code to 
these actors. Perhaps stringent rules on supportive operations may push third 
actors to take responsibility.43
Legal governing structure for the Area and exploitation of its resources 
are found in UNCLOS and in the 1994 Agreement relating to implementing 
Part XI UNCLOS (the 1994 Implementation Agreement). In short, despite 
the reliance by the international community on the development of its laws 
on the slow growth of custom, there is a unique field of action in deep seabed 
mining, which requires a new deliberate amendment. The existing regulatory 
frameworks for exploring minerals in the Area attracted many critics for 
its concise information but densely filled with loopholes on the actor’s 
responsibility.44 
 Art. 153 of the Convention introduces the concept of sponsoring States, 
although it does not specify its measures. Briefly speaking, the Convention 
holds a double legal approach to sponsoring the State’s responsibility, one being 
42  See Note marked with (5) above,  Art. 153 (1).
43  See Michael Faure, “Attribution of Liability: An Economic Analysis of Various Cases,” 
Chicago-Kent Law Review 91, (2016): 605.
44  The key provisions concerning the sponsoring States’ obligations are article 139, paragraph 
1, article 153, paragraph 4 (especially the last sentence), and Annex III, article 4, paragraph 4, 
of the Convention (especially the first sentence). See David Freestone, “Responsibilities and 
Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities for Activities in the Area,” The American 
Journal of International Law 105, no. 4 (2011): 755. 
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enshrined at Art. 139 and Annex III, and the second in the 1994 Implementation 
Agreement. Art. 153 exempts the sponsoring country for damages’ liability 
caused by any failure to comply with Part XI of the Convention by an entity 
sponsored by it under Art. 153, par. 2(b) of the Convention.
 As legal scholars observe, liability in deep seabed mining may differ 
in certain actors’ attribution approaches.45 Strict liability on States is not 
commonly preferable as a legal choice, although contract parties and 
countries may channel sole legal obligations to one actor.  It is a safe option 
for contract parties as the operator holds considerable and efficient control 
over the source of potential damage. Although, eventually, damage in the 
mining area, channeling liability also simplifies the victims’ process.46 Tara 
Davenport observes that such a legal definition may also have several adverse 
effects. First, the sole actor “may not have caused the damage deviated from 
ordinary rules on liability and hence unjust.” Perhaps one liable party system” 
is inefficient to bear the burden of an event which could have been shared 
equally with other responsible parties to the cause in question.47
Eventually, non-channeling liability in the new mining code to the 
operator, the Draft Resolution, imposes an obligation on several persons 
involved in hazardous effects on the marine environment. The redaction of 
the 1999 Protocol to the Basel Convention on Liability and Compensation for 
Damage Resulting from the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes 
and Their Disposal48 It shares responsibility between different persons, and it 
is linked to the sphere of individual responsibility. Each section of operation, 
and consequently its operator, bears the burden of its actions. The Basel 
Protocol mentioned above only applies strict liability to the notifier and the 
importer or the disposer of hazardous wastes.49
45  See Tara Davenport, “Responsibility and Liability for Damage Arising Out of Activities in 
the Area: Attribution of Liability,” Center for International Governance Innovation Liability 
Issues for Deep Seabed Mining Series, (2019): 2. 
46  See general, Neil Craik, “Determining the Standard for Liability for Environmental Harm 
from Deep Seabed Mining Activities” Center for International Governance Innovation Liabil-
ity Issues for Deep Seabed Mining Series Paper, (2018): 23.
47  See also Kristel de Smedt, Hui Wang, and Michael Faure, “Towards Optimal Liability and 
Compensation for Offshore Oil and Gas Activities” in Civil Liability and Financial Security for 
Offshore Oil and Gas Activities, ed. Michael Faure (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2016), 314.
48  See, for example, Basel Protocol, Art. 5, “any person shall be liable for damage caused or 
contributed to by his lack of compliance with the provisions implementing the Convention or 
by his wrongful intentional, reckless or negligent acts or omissions.”. Basel Protocol on Li-
ability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary Movements of Hazard-
ous Wastes and their Disposal, 9 December 1999, UNTS 120(2005) art 4 (not yet entered into 
force). 
49  See also on the Basel Protocol, Jan Albers, Responsibility, and Liability in the Context of 
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In 2011, the ITLOS Seabed Disputes Chamber delivered its first Advisory 
Opinion on Responsibility and Liability for International Seabed Mining,50 
They are aiming at filling in the gaps left by the previously existing legal 
frameworks. First, the Seabed Dispute Chamber clarified the two types of 
obligations derived from Article 139 and Article 4 of UNCLOS’s Annex III. 
Contractors must act with due diligence, and State parties must assist ISA and 
apply a precautionary approach independent of sponsoring mining operators.51 
The Chamber moved forward on the definition of acting with due diligence 
to clarify that State parties can avoid liability by taking “all necessary and 
appropriate measures to secure effective compliance” by the sponsored 
contractor with its obligations.52 
Art. 139 (2) does not directly mention the Authority, but is included in 
the notion of “international organizations acting together shall bear joint and 
several liabilities.”53 In pursuance of section 5 of Part XI, under the current 
dispute settlement procedure, the Seabed Disputes Chamber (SDC) expects 
to act in disputes concerning activities in the Area between States Parties, 
between a State Party and the Authority.54 Also, between parties to a contract, 
the Authority or the Enterprise,55 state enterprises and natural or juridical 
persons referred to in Art. 153, paragraph 2(b).56 Therefore, claims cannot be 
brought directly before the SDC against those third actors. Still, the new Draft 
Exploitation Regulations expect to develop further rules on a more detailed 
obligation on subcontractors.
UNCLOS provides for one type of liability for operators. Many other areas 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes by Sea (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2015): 251. 
50  See Note marked with (1) above.
51  See Note marked with (1) above, 99-140.
52  See Note marked with (1) above, 170-211.
53  Tara highlights that, historically, “this article suggests that this term refers to a group of states 
acting together through an international organization (such as the IOM).” The Authority is men-
tioned in Part XI, which may infer that it was initially not the redactors’ intention to include 
direct liability to the Authority in Art. 139 (2). See Note marked with (38) above. 
54  See Note marked with (5) above, Art. 187 (a): Disputes between States Parties concerning 
the interpretation or application of this Part and the Annexes relating to it;
55  See Note marked with (5) above, Art. 187 (b): disputes between a State Party and the Author-
ity concerning: (i) acts or omissions of the Authority or a State Party alleged to violate this Part 
or the Annexes relating to it or of rules, regulations, and procedures of the Authority adopted in 
accordance in addition to that; or (ii) acts of the Authority alleged to be more than jurisdiction 
or misuse of power; 
56  See Note marked with (5) above, Art. 187 (c) (c) disputes between parties to a con-
tract, being States Parties, the Authority or the Enterprise, state enterprises and natural or ju-
ridical persons referred to in article 153, paragraph 2(b), concerning: (i) the interpreta-
tion or application of a relevant contract or a plan of work; or (ii) acts or omissions of a party to 
the contract relating to activities in the Area and directed to the other party or directly affecting 
its legitimate interests;
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of responsibility lack a direct assessment by the Treaty, e.g., the standard of 
accountability (strict negligence), procedural claims, due diligence defenses, 
and the assessment of damages.57 Besides, Art. 22 of Annex III provides 
that the ISA shall “have responsibility or liability for any loss arising out of 
wrongful acts in the exercise of its powers and functions, including violations 
under article 168, paragraph 2, account being taken of contributory acts or 
omissions by the contractor. Liability in every case shall be for the actual 
amount of damage.58
“Rules, regulations, and procedures shall be drawn up to secure adequate 
protection of the marine environment from harmful effects directly result-
ing from activities in the Area or shipboard processing immediately above 
a mine site of minerals derived from that mine site, taking into account 
the extent to which such harmful effects may directly result from drill-
ing, dredging, coring and excavation and from the disposal, dumping and 
discharge into the marine environment of sediment, wastes or other ef-
fluents.”
Similarly, to avoid serious harm, the Legal and Technical Commission 
(LTC), the ISA’s advisory body, as required by UNCLOS Art. 165(2)(l), 
addresses ISA’s Council, any disapproved mining in areas where “substantial 
evidence indicates the risk of serious harm to the marine environment.” As 
LTC’s operative instruments are not legally binding, the Commission shall 
act as recommendations towards the Council, being the latter responsible for 
issuing emergency orders, including requests for the suspension or change of 
operations.59
Potentially, mining disturbs the seafloor’s large swathes, creates noise 
pollution from machinery, changes to the geochemistry, and may also 
leave footprints in a more substantial amount. The effects on each mining 
site will differ. Although deep seabed mineral resources are broadly similar, 
the site’s deposit and physical conditions may differentiate the direct loss 
of habitat resulting from mining.60 Likely, the mining process will stir 
up seafloor sediments, resulting in a plume of suspended particles.61 The 
57  A. Jaeckel, J. Ardron, and K. Gjerde, “Sharing benefits of the common heritage of human-
kind: Is the deep seabed mining regime ready?’ Marine Policy 70, (2016): 198-204.
58  Myron H. Nordquist, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary 
Volume 6, (The Hague: Kluwer, 2002), 753.
59  See Note marked with (5) above, Art. 162(2) (w).
60  See also Lisa A. Levin, Kathryn Mengerink, Kristina M. Gjerde, et al., “Defining ‘Serious 
Harm’ to The Marine Environment in Deep Seabed Mining,” Marine Policy 74, (December 
2016): 245–259. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.09.032
61  See Note marked with (26) above.
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Managing Impacts of Deep-sea resource exploitation (MIDAS) is a research 
project funded by the European Union’s Seventh Programme for Research, 
Technological Development, and Demonstration under Grant Agreement No. 
603418. It highlights that “Exploration contracts for polymetallic nodules 
cover extensive areas, ranging from 58,000 to 75,000 km2. Exploration 
contracts for polymetallic sulfides are limited to 10,000 km2.”62
  The seabed corresponds to the lowest layer of the ocean and is found in 
territory beyond States’ jurisdiction. The remoteness and difficulty of exploring 
natural resources in these regions are no longer factors that contribute to 
maintaining their preservation, since, with advances in technology, potentially 
new threats are being generated to the previously unexplored ecosystem.63 
The creation of a new legally binding instrument in spatial planning on the 
seabed has already become a reality in the UNESCO Commission. It could 
integrate States and regional spatial planning through a coordinated sectoral 
organization, fulfilling the fragmentation of governance Area left the Montego 
Bay Convention (1982).64
 Mapping the seabed is essential in this new scientific journey in search 
of untapped marine resources. The promotion of scientific programs, such as 
Seabed 203065, will enable a greater systematic understanding of the seabed 
composition, biodiversity, and natural resources. It will have the capacity 
to improve the dialogue about preserving its natural habitat through more 
accurate scientific community knowledge. With the increasingly significant 
changes in its habitat due to global warming, indeed, the knowledge that we 
can achieve today, in scale and volume of the seabed, will be used by future 
generations as a way of learning.
62  The document goes further on the topic, “comprising a maximum of 100 blocks no larger 
than 100 km2. Unlike existing ocean uses, deep-sea mining is a new marine activity that allows 
the precautionary approach to be integrated into the regulatory framework before the onset of 
commercial operations.”
63  The “seabed2030” is a collaborative project between the Nippon Foundation of Japan and the 
General Bathymetric Chart of the Oceans (GEBCO). The project was launched in 2017. It con-
sists of four regional headquarters, responsible for preparing mapping activities, gathering and 
compiling bathymetric information, and collaborating with existing mapping initiatives in their 
regions. See “Seabed2030”, accessed 18 August 2020 https://seabed2030.gebco.net/about_us/. 
64  Oliver Steeds is the CEO of Nekton; a non-profit research foundation highlights the im-
portance of the “Seabed 2030” project as “Our ocean regulates the climate of our planet, pro-
vides food security for billions, produces more than half of our oxygen, captures most of our 
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It is therefore understandable that in the Area, all seabed mining-related 
activities are currently in the exploratory stage, and actual mining is not 
expected before 2025.66 If mining happens irresponsibly, species unknown 
to humankind would be irreversibly lost. According to UNCLOS, it is ISA’s 
responsibility, where mining activities may cause serious harm, to suspend, 
alter, or even end operations.67 Similarly, the Authority is expected to set aside 
areas where mining will not be permitted, such as ensuring denial of a new 
application for a contract to conduct seabed mineral activities.68
 In turn, uncertainties regarding the definition of “effective protection” and 
“serious harm” undermine the Treaty’s clearness and comprehensiveness for 
mining proponents. ISA may resort to FAO’s guidelines on deep-sea bottom 
fishing on the high seas69 As “those that compromise ecosystem integrity.” 
However, as we will see in the following lines, the Authority’s tendency to 
apply a similar formulation for exploration affects.
IV. COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION OF THE 
MINING CODE
In July 2019, the Legal and Technical Commission (LTC) submitted to 
ISA’s Council a Draft’s Resolution proposal on deep-sea mining during its 
twenty-fifth session. The Draft addresses provisions on the approval of a Plan 
of Work, as a contract, further clarifies the rights and obligations of contractors 
and develops rules on marine environment protection.70 The Authority’s 
work on Operationalizing a strategic plan for environmental protection 
resumed in the publication of The Earth Negotiations Bulletin in 2019. ISA is 
pursuing several calls of proposals to clarify further to clarify guidelines on 
environmental compensation funds in exploiting minerals in the Area.71
Delegation of States could comment on the Draft Resolution during the 
66  Luc Cuyvers, Berry Whitney, Kristina M. Gjerde, et al., Deep Seabed Mining: A Rising En-
vironmental Challenge, (Switzerland: IUCN and Gallifrey Foundation, 2018), 47.
67  See Note marked with (5) above, Art. 162 ((2) (w) and (x)and 165 (2)(k) and (l) and An-
nex III Article 18). See also: “Such standards will also inform national laws and regulations 
for mining activities within national jurisdiction, for such rules are to be no less effective than 
international rules, standards, recommended practices, and procedures,” Art. 208.
68  Ibid.
69  “The FAO International Guidelines for the Management of Deep-sea Fisheries in the High 
Seas,” FAO, http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/166308/en
70  “ISA Talks Consider Development of Regulations on Deep-seabed Mining” IISD, accessed 
21 May 2020, https://sdg.iisd.org/news/isa-talks-consider-development-of-regulations-on-
deep-seabed-mining/
71  “Draft Exploitation Regulations,” ISA, accessed 21 May 2020, https://www.isa.org.jm/min-
ing-code/ongoing-development-regulations-exploitation-mineral-resources-area
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meetings scheduled by the Authority. The redaction of Regulation nº4 allows 
the Commission to “recommend to the Council an emergency order, when there 
are clear grounds for believing that Serious Harm to the Marine Environment 
is likely to occur, considering the relevant Guidelines.”72 Critics of this Article 
are two-folded. On the one hand, the Guidelines mentioned above are yet 
to be developed. The document intends to operationalize many of the draft 
regulations that would need to be in place. As the Netherlands delegation 
mentions, there can be counted almost 50 references to “guidelines” during 
the Drafts’ redaction.73 Besides, the regulation does not make it clear whether 
the emergency order  “ may include an order for the suspension or change of 
operations,”74and corroborates to a sense of stepping in a Resolution with no 
apparent legal grounds to contractors. In time, Regulation nº 54, responsible 
for developing the Environmental Compensation Fund, in Paragraph 2, sets 
“The rules and procedures of the Fund will be established by the Council 
on the recommendation of the Finance Committee.”75 No other functioning 
procedures have been clarified, but a deadline for ISA on rules has been 
suggested during the negotiations.76 
The 26th Session of the International Seabed Authority, held in Kingston, 
17–21 February 2020, the need to further clarify the various regulators’ roles 
and responsibilities (e.g., the Authority, sponsoring States and flag States) 
continued to be emphasized.77 As the industry moves from the national water’s 
minerals exploitation to the limits beyond the continental shelf, developing 
standards or guidelines for protecting the marine environment has been 
a constant discussion topic at the Council’s meetings. The binding or non-
binding legal character of regional environmental management plans also 
should be clarified by the Council, as some States have argued in favor of 
legally binding policy instruments, although it was also suggested that all 
matters related to environmental protection should be set out in standards.78
The Seabed Disputes Chamber of  ITLOS in 2011 highlighted the 
possibility of creating an “Environmental compensation fund about an 
72  See Note marked with (63) above.
73  “Draft regulations on exploitation of mineral resources in the Area (ISBA/25/C/WP.1) Com-





77  “Comments on the draft regulations on the exploitation of mineral resources in the Area 
(ISBA/26/C/2)”, International Seabed Authority, accessed 2 October 2020, https://isa.org.jm/
files/files/documents/26-c-2-en.pdf.
78  Ibid. 
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environmental liability gap that may arise.”79 Legally, the Authority may 
request an allocation of a trust fund to compensate for the damage not covered. 
Hypothetically, suppose a contractor does not meet its liability in full, and the 
sponsoring State is not liable under Article 139 (2) of the Convention. In that 
case, the Chamber finds a suitable premise for the fund’s creation to Art 235, 
paragraph 3, of the UNCLOS. 80 It is analyzing the redaction of Art. 139 (2), 
and the “without prejudice clause” to international law rules, the Chamber 
unveils Art’s openness. 304 of UNCLOS81It is unnecessary to demonstrate 
material damage to the deep seabed to request an investigation on the 
sponsoring State’s liability for an eventual failure to meet its obligations, as 
covered by customary international law.82 Therefore, the new Draft Resolution 
is an open the door to new developments in deep seabed mining. The Chamber 
points out to the volatile characteristics of existing international law rules on 
responsibility and liability. Occasionally, the original document under the 
Authority’s auspices may even be correlated to the further development of 
new customary international law.83
We are still learning about the ocean floor’s ecosystem. The lack of 
scientific knowledge is negotiating upon the next mining code. If information 
is not available to set particular ecological thresholds,84 Key metrics help 
scientists argue for higher ecological limits in developing projects, such as 
biodiversity, abundance, habitat quality, population. Additional considerations 
reflect the habitat variation under the auspices of the new mining code. 
However, it is possible to summarize the adverse change and effects of mining 
the seabed floor85 These impacts can be tested in local, regional, or global 
contexts. Therefore, the Draft Resolution must be mindful of each ecosystem-
based and its habitat heterogeneity. 
The evaluation of cumulative effects in a setting or region is also a 
79  See Note marked with (1) above, para. 205. 
80  See Note marked with (1) above, 203-206.
81  The final version of Art. 304 as follows: “The provisions of this Convention regarding re-
sponsibility and liability for damage are without prejudice to the application of existing rules 
and the development of further rules regarding responsibility and liability under international 
law,” 
82  Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1970, p. 306.
83  See Note marked with (1) above, 211.
84  See, for example, “A Geological Model of Polymetallic Nodule Deposits in the Clarion Clip-
perton Fracture Zone,” International Seabed Authority Technical Report No. 6, 2010; Peter M. 
Groffman, Jill S. Baron, Tamara Blett, et al., “Ecological Thresholds: The Key to Successful 
Environmental Management or An Important Concept with No Practical Application?” Ecosys-
tems 9, no.1 (2006):1–13.
85  As an example: extinction, a significant decline in abundance, the decline in foundation 
species, reduction below critical reproductive density, loss of source populations, and loss of 
critical stepping-stone populations.
Laisa Branco de Almeida
18
multifaceted impact on the new mining code to be wary. Scholars alert to 
the magnitude of the impact of cumulative mining activities within an area 
being difficult with current knowledge for the long-run future. An extensive 
EIA and a precautionary approach help contractors define multiple stressors 
related to climate change, pollution, marine litter, chemical pollution, and 
natural products.86 In times of law-abiding on climate change de-escalation, 
allowing large-scale mining activities knowingly that it may stimulate multiple 
potentially harmful effects throughout- the water column seems collectively 
irresponsible. 
V. CONCLUSION
 Deep seabed mining is a complex operation from the scientific point of 
view as from the rules of the laws’ perspective. The Authority is the primary 
regulator of mining operations in the Area and shares responsibility for 
damage arising out of their wrongful act in conjunction with the contractor. 
Eventually, the UN organ is not interested in bearing such a burden of a 
disastrous operation in a sensible ecosystem as the deep seabed. In the exercise 
of its powers and functions, it is expected that the Authority will guarantee 
that violations under Art. Twenty-two of Annex III, and Art. 168 (2) remains 
unviolated for the future. 
The search for a cure in times of global pandemics accelerates the process 
of exploration of the seabed. The protection of its biodiversity is necessary in 
a preventive way, despite the international regulation on companies’ liability 
for damages beyond the States’ jurisdiction that can still be better elaborated. 
Genetic resources, as well as seabed minerals, also need attention. Both, 
when associated with the pharmaceutical industry, have high economic value. 
Therefore, the Authority’s responsibilities are of high interest to the global 
community, which should also exercise its vigilant and protective role.
 The current framework governing deep seabed mining in ABNJ is hybrid. 
It seeks responsibility for states, international organizations, state enterprises, 
and private companies. In terms of legal liability, the situation involves different 
civic and global concepts being applied simultaneously. Worth mentioning 
that recognizing the responsibility to the Authority and the sponsoring state 
vis-à-vis the contractor potentially raises the level of due diligence of all 
actors involved in the process. Although there is no imposition of liability 
86  See also C.L. Van Dover, C.R. Smith, L. Godet, “Chemosynthetic Ecosystems: understand-
ing what is at Risk and Tools for Effective Management,” in Marine Protected Areas at the 
High Seas–Symposium, London, United Kingdom, 2011.
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in the current framework to third actors, such as subcontractors, agents, or 
persons working for the contractor, the latter could be legally responsible for 
the subsequent agents following the mining operation.
 To this end, the new Draft Resolution intends to clarify further the 
attribution of liability in the bottomless seabed mining forum and the 
compensation regime (facing harm to the marine environment). Questions 
remain open on whether ISA would be responsible for paying compensation 
funds, and it is expected further clarification on the applicable liability rules 
for the Enterprise.87 The Authority sets open communication with society to 
discuss the remaining controversial topics, although reconciling deep seabed 
mining with current high environmental protection stages seems demanding.
87  See Note marked with (39) above.
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